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Abstract
Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but
information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been
almost untouched in the previous research. Duo to the essential difference between
classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, in-
cluding probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This
paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-
flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen
and Meseguer’s noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum nonin-
terference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems
is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control
in quantum systems.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that quantum cryptography has a great advantage over its classical coun-
terpart that the security and ability to detect the presence of eavesdropping are provable,
based on the principles of quantum mechanics. But it has been rarely noticed that quantum
computing and communication systems also face a new security challenge that would not
arise in classical systems: entanglement is indispensable in quantum computation and com-
munication, but information leakage can be caused by an entanglement (or more precisely,
a computational mechanism that can generate an entanglement, e.g. the CNOT gate; see
Examples 3.1 and 4.1), and thus the Trojan Horse may exploit an entanglement between
itself and a user with sensitive information as a covert channel.
Information-flow security policies are usually enforced to prevent improper information
leakage in classical computing and communication system [20]. A general framework for
specifying and analysing information-flow security is the noninterference formalism first
introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [7]. The basic idea of noninterference [7] is:
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• “One group of agents, using a certain set of commands, is non-interfering with an-
other group of agents if what the first group does with those commands has no effect
on what the second group can see.”
Then information leakage from a group of agents to another group of agents is understood
as interference of the first group with the second group, and security is defined as non-
interference of the agents with sensitive information with those malicious agents. In the
original formulation [7] of noninterference, its system model is a deterministic automaton.
This model has been generalised to a nondeterministic automaton by Sutherland [21] and
McCullough [14] and further to a probabilistic automaton by Grag [9].
This paper aims at extending further the noninterference formalism so that it can be
used to reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. A quantum system is
in a sense a probabilistic system, but the theory of probabilistic noninterference [9] cannot
be directly applied to it due to the following two reasons:
1. In a quantum system a probability distribution of outputs only appears after a certain
measurement. Any observation about a classical or probabilistic system by an agent
does not disturb the state of the observed system and thus has no interference with
other agents. However, a basic postulate of quantum mechanics stipulates that the
only way for acquiring information about a quantum system is quantum measure-
ment, which will alter the state of the observed system. Thus, interference between
different agents will be introduced during observation on quantum systems.
2. The computational steps of a quantum system are governed by unitary operators or
more generally super-operators, which are essentially different from stochastic matri-
ces that are commonly used to model the dynamics of probabilistic systems. In other
words, the mathematical description of commands executed by an agent in a classical
or probabilistic systems is different from that in a quantum system.
To appropriately incorporate quantum features into the noninterference formalism, we de-
fine a system model in terms of quantum automata [15].
Di Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky [2] observed that absolute noninterference can hardly
ever be achieved in real systems, and thus they proposed a novel notion of approximate
noninterference based on a quantitative measure of process behaviour equivalence. The
non-appropriateness of absolute noninterference is even truer in the quantum case because
quantum gates form a continuum and noise in their physical implementation is unavoidable.
So, we define a quantitative version of noninterference (or approximate noninterference) for
quantum systems, following Di Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky [2]. (A notion of approximate
behaviour equivalence was also adopted by the authors in their work on both classical and
quantum process algebras [26], [24], [25, 4].)
The main technical contribution of this paper are:
• Unwinding proof technique: It is often hard to establish noninterference security be-
cause noninterference is defined as a property over sequences of commands of arbi-
trary length. A unwinding technique was proposed by Goguen and Meseguer [8],
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which can prove noninterference by checking only certain single-step conditions.
This technique was generalised by Rushby [19] and van der Meyden [22] to the case
of intransitive noninterference. We further generalise this technique and provide a
method for estimating the upper bound of insecurity degree of quantum system.
• Compositionality of security: A research line on compositionality of security was
initiated by McCullough [14] and recently systemised by Mantel [13], showing that
secure components with appropriate interface can be hooked up to form a secure
system. As a quantum generalisation of their compositionality theorems, we prove
that the insecurity degree of a composed quantum system does not exceed the sum of
the insecurity degrees of their components provided no entanglement exists between
those components.
As an application of the proposed formalism, we consider access control of quantum
data. The operating systems of all modern computers include certain form of access control
to protect confidential data. Access control of quantum data will certainly be an important
issue in the design of an operating system for future quantum computers. The simplest
access control policy is usually defined in terms of access control matrix, which specifies
the access rights of agents to individual storage locations. A quantum access control matrix
is much more complicated than its classical counterpart due to a subtle difference between
classical and quantum information:
• “1+ 1 < 2”: Access to the quantum information stored in a composite AB system is
not granted by access to the information stored in subsystem A and access to that in
subsystem B (see Example 6.1).
More precisely, a quantum access control matrix has to specify the access rights of agents
not only to individual storage locations but also to different combinations of individual lo-
cations. Rushby [19] showed by the unwinding technique that security of access control
can be properly interpreted in the noninterference formalism with the Reference Monitor
Assumptions. As a quantum generalisation of Rushby’s result [19], we show that the inse-
curity degree of quantum access control is bounded by a linear function of the degree that
the Reference Monitor Assumptions are satisfied.
The paper is organised as follows. Since the majority of Computer Security Foundations
community may have no background in quantum computation, we briefly review its basics
including the mathematical formalism of the state space and dynamics of a quantum system
and quantum measurement in Sec. 2; for more details we refer to [16]. Another purpose of
Sec. 2 is to fix notations used in the later sections. The automata model of quantum systems
and a noninterference measure in such a model are introduced in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we
define the core notion - security degree of quantum systems - in terms of the noninterference
measure, and the unwinding technique for proving security is generalised to the quantum
setting. A compositionality theorem for quantum security is established in Sec. 5. The
security properties of access control of quantum data are examined in Sec. 6. A brief
conclusion is drawn in Sec. 7, including several problems for further research. For the
readability, we postpone all the proofs of theorems to the Appendix.
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2 Basics of Quantum Theory
2.1 Hilbert Spaces
According to a basic postulate of quantum mechanics, the state space of a quantum system
is represented by a Hilbert space. In this paper, we only consider finite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces, which are indeed complex vector spaces with inner product. We assume the reader
is familiar with the notion of vector space in Linear Algebra. An inner product over a vector
space H is a mapping 〈·|·〉 : H×H → C satisfying the following properties:
1. 〈ϕ|ϕ〉 ≥ 0 with equality if and only if |ϕ〉 = 0;
2. 〈ϕ|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|ϕ〉∗; and
3. 〈ϕ|λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2〉 = λ1〈ϕ|ψ1〉+ λ2〈ϕ|ψ2〉
for any |ϕ〉, |ψ〉, |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 ∈ H and for any λ1, λ2 ∈ C, where C is the field of complex
numbers, and ∗ stands for the conjugate of complex numbers. A vector |ψ〉 is called a
unit vector if 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1. A pure state of a quantum system is described by a unit vector
in its state space. Two vectors |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 are said to be orthogonal, written |ϕ〉⊥|ψ〉 if
〈ϕ|ψ〉 = 0. A family {|ψi〉}n−1i=0 of unit vectors is called an orthonormal basis of H if
1. |ψi〉⊥|ψj〉 for any i 6= j; and
2. |ψ〉 =∑n−1i=0 〈ψi|ψ〉|ψi〉 for all |ψ〉 ∈ H.
In this case, H is said to be n−dimensional, each element |ψ〉 of H can be represented by a
column vector |ψ〉 = (a0, ..., an−1)T , where ai = 〈ψi|ψ〉 for 0 ≤ i < n, and T stands for
transpose.
Example 2.1 Quantum bit, or qubit for short, is the quantum counterpart of the bit in
classical computation. The state space of qubits is the 2−dimensional Hilbert space
H2 = {α|0〉 + β|1〉 : α, β ∈ C}.
The inner product of |ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 and |ϕ〉 = α′|0〉+ β′|1〉 is
〈ψ|ϕ〉 = α∗α′ + β∗β′.
The vectors
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
form an orthonormal basis ofH2, called its computational basis. A qubit can be in the basis
states |0〉 and |1〉 as well as their superpositions
α|0〉+ β|1〉 =
(
α
β
)
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where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, such as
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) = 1√
2
(
1
1
)
,
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) = 1√
2
(
1
−1
)
.

The state space of a composite quantum system is defined to be the tensor product of
the state spaces of its subsystems. Let Hi be a Hilbert space with {|ψij〉} as an orthonormal
basis for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the tensor product of Hi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the Hilbert space
with {|ψ1j1 ...ψnjn〉} as an orthonormal basis, i.e.
n⊗
i=1
Hi = {
∑
j1,...,jn
αj1...jn|ψ1j1 ...ψnjn〉 :
αj1...jn ∈ C for all j1, ..., jn}
where |ψ1j1 ...ψnjn〉 = |ψ1j1〉...|ψnjn〉 is the product of basis states |ψ1j1 , ..., |ψnjn〉 of the
subsystems. In particular, if Hi = H for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
⊗n
i=1Hi will be abbreviated
to H⊗n.
Example 2.2 The state space of two-qubits is H⊗22 , and a two-qubit system can be in a
separable state like |00〉, |1+〉, and it can also be in an entangled state like the EPR pair
|β00〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉).

2.2 Density Operators
We also assume the reader is familiar with the notion of linear operator. If {|i〉}n−1i=0 is a
(fixed) orthonormal basis of an n−dimensional Hilbert space H, then an operator A on it
can be represented by n× n matrix A = (Aij) where the entries Aij is defined by
A|i〉 =
n−1∑
j=0
Aji|j〉
for every 0 ≤ i < n. An operator A on H is said to be positive if 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all states
|ψ〉 ∈ H. The trace of an operator A is defined to be
tr(A) =
∑
i
〈ψi|A|ψi〉,
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where {|ψi〉} is an orthonormal basis of H. If the operator is represented by an n × n
matrix A = (Aij), then its trace is the sum of the entries on the diagonal of A, i.e. tr(A) =∑n
i=1Aii. A mixed state of a quantum system can be described as a density operator when
it is not completely known. Let {|ψi〉} be a family of states in H. If a system is in state |ψi〉
with probability pi for each i, and
∑
i pi = 1, then the state of the system is represented by
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|,
where |ψi〉〈ψi| is an operator defined as follows: (|ψi〉〈ψi|)|ϕ〉 = 〈ψi|ϕ〉|ψi〉 for each
|ϕ〉 ∈ H. We say that ρ is a mixed state generated by the ensemble {(pi, |ψi〉)} of pure
states. A density operator ρ on a Hilbert space H is defined to be a positive operator with
tr(ρ) = 1. An operator is a density operator if and only if it can be generated by an
ensemble of pure states. In particular, we identify a pure state |ψ〉 with the density operator
|ψ〉〈ψ|.
Example 2.3 The mixed state of a qubit generated by ensemble {(23 , |0〉), (13 , |1〉} is repre-
sented by density operator
ρ =
2
3
|0〉〈0| + 1
3
|−〉〈−| = 1
6
(
5 −1
−1 1
)
(1)

2.3 Unitary Operators
For an operator A on H, if another operator A† satisfies (|ϕ〉, A|ψ〉) = (A†|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) for all
|ϕ〉, |ψ〉, then A† is called the adjoint of A, where (|χ〉, |ζ〉) stands for the inner produce
〈χ|ζ〉. An operator U is called a unitary operator if U †U = IH, where and in the sequel
IH stands for the identity operator on H. The basic postulate of quantum mechanics about
evolution of systems may be stated as follows: Suppose that the states of a closed quantum
system at times t0 and t are |ψ0〉 and |ψ〉, respectively. Then they are related to each other
by a unitary operator U which depends only on the times t0 and t:
|ψ〉 = U |ψ0〉.
This postulate can be reformulated in the language of density operators as follows. The
state ρ of a closed quantum system at time t is related to its state ρ0 at time t0 by a unitary
operator U which depends only on the times t and t0:
ρ = Uρ0U
†.
A unitary transformation of a state in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space can be calculated
by matrix multiplication.
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Example 2.4 An example of unitary operator on one qubit is the rotation about x−axis of
the Bloch sphere (see [16], page 19):
Rx(θ) =
(
cos θ2 −i sin θ2
−i sin θ2 cos θ2
)
where 0 ≤ θ < 2π. It transforms the basis state |0〉 into a superposition of |0〉 and |1〉:
Rx(θ)|0〉 =
(
cos θ2 −i sin θ2
−i sin θ2 cos θ2
)(
1
0
)
=
(
cos θ2
−i sin θ2
)
= cos
θ
2
|0〉 − i sin θ
2
|1〉.
The controlled-NOT is a unitary operator on two qubits:
CNOT =
(
I 0
0 X
)
,
where I, 0 are 2× 2 unit and zero matrices, respectively, and
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
is the NOT gate. The CNOT gate can produce entanglement:
CNOT (|+ 0〉) = |β00〉,
meaning that separable state |+ 0〉 = |+〉|0〉 is transformed to EPR pair |β00〉 
2.4 Super-Operators
A quantum computing or communication system is often not a closed system because it
may suffer from unwanted interactions from the environment. The dynamics of an open
quantum system cannot be described by a unitary operator, and one of its mathematical
formalisms is the notion of super-operator. A super-operator on a Hilbert space H is a
linear operator E from the space of linear operators on H into itself which satisfies the
following two conditions:
1. tr[E(ρ)] ≤ 1 for each density operator ρ;
2. Complete positivity: for any extra Hilbert spaceHR, (IR⊗E)(A) is positive provided
A is a positive operator on HR ⊗H, where IR is the identity operation on HR.
If condition 1) is strengthened to tr[E(ρ)] = 1 for all density operators ρ, then E is said to
be trace-preserving. In this paper, we only consider trace-preserving super-operators. For
any unitary operator U , if we define E(ρ) = UρU † for all ρ, then U can be seen as a special
super-operator E .
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Example 2.5 The bit flip channel is widely used in quantum communication. This channel
flips the state of a qubit from |0〉 to |1〉 and vice versa, with probability 1 − p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
It is described by the super-operator E on the 2−dimensional Hilbert space H2, defined as
follows:
E(ρ) = E0ρE0 + E1ρE1
for all density operator ρ, where E0 = √pI, E1 = √1− pX, and I,X are the 2 × 2
unit matrix and the NOT gate, respectively. For example, if ρ is given by Eq. (1), then it is
transformed by E to another density operator
E(ρ) =
(
1
6 +
2p
3 −16
−16 56 − 2p3 .
)

2.5 Quantum Measurements
To acquire information about a quantum system, a measurement must be performed on it.
In quantum computing, measurement is usually used to read out a computational result. A
quantum measurement on a system with state space H is described by a collection {Mλ} of
operators satisfying ∑
λ
M
†
λMλ = IH,
where Mλ are called measurement operators, and the indices λ stand for the measurement
outcomes. If the state of a quantum system is |ψ〉 immediately before the measurement,
then the probability that result λ occurs is
p(λ) = 〈ψ|M †λMλ|ψ〉
and the state of the system after the measurement is
|ψλ〉 = Mλ|ψ〉√
p(λ)
.
We can also formulate the quantum measurement postulate in the language of density op-
erators. If the state of a quantum system was ρ immediately before measurement {Mλ} is
performed on it, then the probability that result λ occur is
p(λ) = tr(M †λMλρ),
and the state of the system after the measurement is
ρλ =
MλρM
†
λ
p(λ)
.
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Example 2.6 The measurement on a qubit in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} is M =
{M0,M1}, where
M0 = |0〉〈0| =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, M1 = |1〉〈1| =
(
0 0
0 1
)
If we perform M on a qubit in (mixed) state ρ given in Eq. (1), then the probability that we
get outcome 0 is
p(0) = tr(M0ρ) = tr
(
5
6 0
0 0
)
=
5
6
and the probability of outcome 1 is p(1) = 16 . In the case that the outcome is 0, the qubit
will be in state |0〉 after the measurement, and in the case that the outcome is 1, it will be in
state |1〉. 
2.6 POVM Measurements
In defining noninterference, agents observe the system only at the end, and thus the post-
measurement state of the system is of little interest. The Positive-Operator Valued Mea-
sure (POVM for short) formalism is especially suited to the analysis of noninterference. A
POVM measurement on Hilbert space H consists of a family of positive operators {Eλ}
such that ∑
λ
Eλ = IH.
If it is performed on a system in pure state |ψ〉, then the probability of outcome λ is
p(λ) = 〈ψ|Eλ|ψ〉;
and if the system is in mixed state ρ before measurement, then the probability of outcome
λ is
p(λ) = tr(Eλρ).
Each ordinary quantum measurement {Mλ} defined in Subsec. 2.5 can be seen as a special
POVM measurement if we put Eλ = M †λMλ for all λ.
Example 2.7 Let
E1 =
√
2
1 +
√
2
|1〉〈1|, E2 =
√
2
1 +
√
2
|−〉〈−|
and E3 = I − E1 − E2, where I is the identity operator on the 2−dimensional Hilbert
space. Then {E1, E2, E3} is a POVM measurement. If we perform it on a qubit in the state
ρ given in Eq. (1), then the probabilities of outcomes 1, 2 and 3 are, respectively,
p(1) =
√
2
6(1 +
√
2)
, p(2) =
√
2
3(1 +
√
2)
, p(3) =
2 +
√
2
2(1 +
√
2)
.

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3 Noninterference in Quantum Systems
3.1 An Automata Model of Quantum Systems
Following Goguen and Meseguer’s original formulation [7], the system models used in the
studies of noninterference have been mainly automata. A probabilistic automata model was
employed by Gray [9] in his work on probabilistic (non)interference. Here, we introduce an
automata model for quantum systems.
Definition 3.1 A quantum system is a 6−tuple
S = 〈H, ρ0, A,C, do,measure〉,
where:
1. H is a Hilbert space, and it is the state space of the system;
2. ρ0 is a density operator in H, and it is the initial state;
3. A is a set of agents;
4. C is a set of commands;
5. do = {Ea,c|a ∈ A and c ∈ C}, and for each a ∈ A and for each c ∈ C , Ea,c
is a super-operator on H, specifying how states are updated by agent a executing
command c;
6. measure = {Ma|a ∈ A}, and for each a ∈ A, Ma is a set of POVM measurements
on H, and intuitively, Ma consists of all POVM measurements that agent a is allowed
to perform.
The above automata model is defined in a way much more general than that in the
majority of quantum automata literature, for example [15], where only pure states, unitary
operators and ordinary (even projective) quantum measurements are considered. Here, we
work with the language of density operators (mixed states), super-operators are employed to
specify the executions of commands, and POVM measurements are used to describe agents’
observation. The major motivation for such a general model is that density operators, super-
operators and POVM measurements are commonly adopted in quantum information theory,
see for example [16], Chapter 12. We hope that our results presented in this paper can
be smoothly incorporated with quantum information theory to analyse security of quantum
computing and communication systems.
Several essential differences between classical and quantum systems deserve careful
explanations. First, the state space of a classical automaton is usually assumed to be discrete
and even finite. In this paper, we only consider finite-dimensional quantum automata. But
even so, their state Hilbert spaces are a continuum and thus deem-to-be infinite. Second,
in the system models of both classical and probabilistic noninterference, the outcomes of
agents’ observations are deterministic. However, an observation on a quantum system is
10
always done through a quantum measurement which in principle cannot give a deterministic
outcome but only a probability distribution of possible outcomes. In addition, an agent may
be allowed to observe the system with different measurements which will give different
distributions of outcomes.
Before going ahead, we need to fix some notations. We write Σ∗ for the set of all finite
sequences of elements in Σ. For any α = α1α2 · · ·αn ∈ (A × C)∗, the length of α is
|α| = n. We write α(i] for the head α1α2 · · ·αi of α for every i ≤ n. Also, we write
Eα = Eαn ◦ · · · ◦ Eα2 ◦ Eα1
for the composition of Eα1 , Eα2 , · · · , Eαn , that is,
Eα(ρ) = Eαn(· · · (Eα2(Eα1(ρ))) · · · )
for every density operator ρ in H.
3.2 Measurement Distance between Density Operators
Noninterference is defined through a group of agents’ nondiscrimination between the final
states of the system with and without another group of agents’ actions. In the quantum case,
observation outcomes are always represented by the probability distributions determined by
the involved measurements. So, we first need a distance to measure the difference between
two distributions. Let X be a finite or countably infinite set. A probability distribution over
X is a mapping p : X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈X p(x) = 1. For each event E ⊆ X, the
probability of E is given by
p(E) =
∑
x∈E
p(x).
For any two probability distributions p and q over X, their distance is defined to be
d(p, q) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|p(x)− q(x)|.
It is easy to see that
d(p, q) = max
E⊆X
|p(E) − q(E)|. (2)
This equality indicates that the distance does not depends on the cardinality of the sample
space X.
The above distance between probability distributions can be naturally generalised to
a pseudo distance between density operators through quantum measurements. Let E =
{Eλ|λ ∈ Λ} be a POVM measurement on H. Then for any density operator ρ in H, we can
define a probability distribution pE(ρ) = pE(ρ, ·) over the measurement outcomes Λ by
pE(ρ, λ) = tr(Eλρ)
for every λ ∈ Λ.
Now we consider a family M of POVM measurements.
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Definition 3.2 The pseudo distance defined by M is given by
dM(ρ, σ) = sup
E∈M
d(pE(ρ), pE(σ))
for all density operators ρ and σ.
Intuitively, dM(ρ, σ) measures the difference between ρ and σ that can be detected by
POVM measurements in M.
A distance between density operators widely used in quantum information theory is
trace distance. Recall from [16], Sec. 9.2 that for any density operators ρ and σ, their trace
distance is defined by
d(ρ, σ) =
1
2
tr|ρ− σ|,
where |A| =
√
A†A is the positive square root of A†A for linear operator A. The following
theorem establishes a connection between trace distance and distance defined by measure-
ments.
Theorem 3.1 ([16], Theorem 9.1)
d(ρ, σ) = sup
E
d(pE(ρ), pE(σ)), (3)
where the supremum is over all POVM measurements. In other words, if we take M to be
the set of all POVM measurements, then d(ρ, σ) = dM(ρ, σ). 
3.3 (Non)interference Degree
To present the definition of (non)interference degree, we need several more notations. If
G ⊆ A is a group of agents, D ⊆ C is a set of commands, and α = α1α2 · · ·αn ∈ (A×C)∗,
then following the literature [19, 22] on classical noninterference, we write purgeG,D(α)
for the subsequence of α obtained by deleting those αi = (ai, ci) with ai ∈ G and ci ∈ D;
that is,
purgeG,D(α) = α
′
1α
′
2...α
′
n,
where
α′i =
{
ǫ if αi = (a, c) with a ∈ G and c ∈ D,
αi otherwise.
We will simply write purgeG(·) for purgeG,C(·). For each agent a ∈ A, we write da =
dMa for the pseudo distance defined by the set Ma of POVM measurements.
Definition 3.3 Let G1, G2 ⊆ A be two groups of agents, and let D ⊆ C be a set of com-
mands. Then the degree that agents G1 with commands D interfere agents G2 is
Int(G1,D|G2) = sup{da(Eα(ρ0), EpurgeG1,D(α)(ρ0))
|α ∈ (A× C)∗, a ∈ G2}.
(4)
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Intuitively, the larger is Int(G1,D|G2), the more agents G1 with commands D interfere
with agents G2. In particular, if G1 with D does not interfere with G2, that is,
Eα(ρ0) = EpurgeG1,D(α)(ρ0) (5)
for all α ∈ (A×C)∗ and for all a ∈ G2, then Int(G1,D|G2) = 0.Conversely, Int(G1,D|G2) =
0 does not necessarily imply Eq. (5) because da may not be a distance but only a pseudo
distance. In this case, the difference between Eα(ρ0) and EpurgeG1,D(α)(ρ0) cannot be de-
tected by agents in G2 using the quantum measurements allowed for them. We will simply
write Int(G1|G2) for Int(G1, C|G2). If Int(G1,D|G2) = 0, then we write G1,D : |G2.
Furthermore, we will simply write G1 : |G2 for G1, C : |G2.
The following proposition considers a special case where agents have the full capacity
of measurements, and it follows immediately from Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 If each agent a ∈ G2 can perform any POVM measurement; that is, Ma is
the set of all POVM measurements on H, then
Int(G1,D|G2) = sup{d(Eα(ρ0), EpurgeG1,D(α)(ρ0))
|α ∈ (A× C)∗}.

To illustrate the notion defined above, we give a simple example.
Example 3.1 We consider a system with two qubits. So its state space is H⊗22 , where H2
is the 2−dimensional Hilbert space (see Example 2.1). There are two agents Alice and
Bob: A = {Alice,Bob}. They are allowed to perform the measurement in the compu-
tational basis (see Example 2.6) on the first and second qubits, respectively: MAlice =
{M1},MBob = {M2}, where Mi stands for the computational basis measurement on the
ith qubit for i = 1, 2. The initial state is assumed to be |ψ0〉 = |00〉.
1. Isolated Alice and Bob: If there is only one command Rx(θ): C = {Rx(θ)}, and
when Alice (resp. Bob) execute Rx(θ), she (resp. he) rotate the first (resp. second)
qubit by an angle θ about the x−axis of the Bloch sphere (see Example 2.4), then the
following claim is obvious:
• Claim: Alice : |Bob and Bob : |Alice; that is, Alice does not interfere with
Bob, and vice versa.
2. Adding one-way CNOT: Now we add the CNOT gate (see Example 2.4) into the com-
mand set and put C = {Rx(θ), CNOT}. Suppose that when both Alice and Bob ex-
ecutes the command CNOT , the controlled-NOT transformation is performed with
the first qubit as the control qubit and the second as the target qubit. Then we have:
• Claim 1: Bob,Rx(θ) : |Alice; that is,
Int(Bob,Rx(θ)|Alice) = 0,
Bob with rotation about x−axis does not interfere with Alice.
13
• Claim 2: If θ 6= 0, π, then
Int(Bob,CNOT |Alice) > 0;
that is, Bob with controlled-NOT interferes with Alice.
• Claim 3: If θ > 0, then
Int(Alice,Rx(θ)|Bob) > 0,
Int(Alice, CNOT |Bob) > 0;
that is, Alice with either rotation about x−axis or controlled-NOT interferes
with Bob.
To prove Claim 1, we notice that each α ∈ (A × C)∗ is a sequence of the following
actions:
• B1: Alice execute Rx(θ) on the first qubit;
• B2: Bob executes Rx(θ) on the second qubit;
• B3: Alice or Bob executes CNOT with the first qubit as the control qubit and
the second as the target qubit.
It is obvious that B1 and B2 commute: B1B2 = B2B1. Also, it follows from
Eq. (4.39) in [16] that B2 and B3 commute. Suppose that Bob executes Rx(θ) in
α for n times. Then we can move all Rx(θ) executed by Bob to the end of α and
obtain
α′ = purge(α)(Bob,Rx(θ))n,
where purge(α) = purgeBob,Rx(θ)(α) is obtained by deleting all Rx(θ) executed by
Bob from α. We write |ψ〉, |ψ′〉, |ϕ〉 for the states after the system performs α, α′,
and purge(α), respectively. Then |ϕ〉 can be written in the following form: |ϕ〉 =
|0〉|ϕ0〉+ |1〉|ϕ1〉, and it holds that
|ψ〉 = |ψ′〉 = |0〉Rx(nθ)|ϕ0〉+ |1〉Rx(nθ)|ϕ1〉.
Finally, Alice measures the first qubit of |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 in the computational basis, she
gets the same probability distribution:
p(ψ, 0) = ||Rx(nθ)|ϕ0〉|| = |||ϕ0〉|| = p(ϕ, 0),
p(ψ, 1) = ||Rx(nθ)|ϕ1〉|| = |||ϕ1〉|| = p(ϕ, 1).
Now we consider action sequence α = (Alice,Rx(θ))(Alice, CNOT ) (Bob,CNOT )(Alice,Rx(θ)).
The state of the system after α is executed is |ϕ〉 = (cos θ|0〉 − i sin θ|1〉)|0〉, and the
state after purgeBob,CNOT (α) is executed is
|ψ〉 =|0〉[cos2(θ
2
)|0〉 − sin2(θ
2
)|1〉]
− i sin θ
2
cos
θ
2
|1〉(|0〉 + |1〉).
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If Alice measures the first qubit of |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 in the computational basis, then the
probability distributions of outcomes are
p(0) = cos2 θ, p(1) = sin2 θ,
q(0) = cos4(
θ
2
) + sin4(
θ
2
), q(1) = 2 sin2(
θ
2
) cos2(
θ
2
),
respectively. This implies Claim 2.
To prove Claim 3, consider action sequence α = (Alice,Rx(θ)) (Alice, CNOT ).
The state becomes
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
|00〉 − i sin θ
2
|11〉
after executing α, and it does not change after executing purgeAlice,Rx(θ)(α) =
(Alice, CNOT ). If Bob measure the second qubit of |ψ〉 and |ψ0〉 in the compu-
tational basis, then the probability distributions are
p(0) = cos2(
θ
2
), p(1) = sin2(
θ
2
),
p0(0) = 1, p0(1) = 0,
respectively. So,
Int(Alice,Rx(θ)|Bob) ≥ d(p, p0) = sin2(θ
2
) > 0.
Similarly, we can prove Int(Alice, CNOT |Bob) > 0.
3. Adding two-way CNOT: Finally, we reverse the direction of the CNOT executed by
Bob: Suppose that when Bob executes the command CNOT, the second qubit is used
as the control qubit and the first qubit is the target. The direction executed by Alice is
unchanged. Then we have:
• Claim: If θ > 0, then
Int(Bob,Rx(θ)|Alice) > 0,
Int(Bob,CNOT |Alice) > 0,
Int(Alice,Rx(θ)|Bob) > 0,
Int(Alice, CNOT )|Bob) > 0;
that is, Alice always interferes with Bob, and vice versa.
The proof of this claim is similar to that of the above Claims 2 and 3. 
The above example indicates that the CNOT gate may cause information leaking in
quantum computing. The reason is that certain entanglement between Alice and Bob is
created by the CNOT gate.
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4 Security Policies
Information-flow security policies specify how can information flows from one agent to
another. We first recall the formal definition of security policy from the literature [19, 22]
on classical information-flow security.
Definition 4.1 A policy is a reflexive relation between agents:  ⊆ A×A.
Intuitively, a  b means that actions of agent a are permitted to interfere with agent b
or information is permitted to flow from agent a to agent b.
Since security policies about a system are only relevant to the rights of agents but not
the physical operations in the system such as evolution and observation, it is reasonable
to adopt the same definition of policy for classical and quantum systems. Now we can
define the notion of security for quantum systems with respect to a given policy based on
noninterference. To do so, we need an additional notation. For any agent a ∈ A, we write
▽a = {b ∈ A|b 6 a} for the set of agents from who information cannot flow to agent a.
4.1 Unbounded-Time Security
Definition 4.2 The security degree of system S with respect to policy  is
K(S, ) = sup
a∈A
Int(▽a|a). (6)
Intuitively, Int(▽a|a) is the degree that the agents, from whom the policy specifies
that information cannot flow to agent a, interfere with a. K(S, ) takes the supremum
of Int(▽a|a) over all agents a ∈ A, and thus measures the global degree that an agent
interfere with another agent although information flow from the former to the latter is not
allowed by the policy . Therefore, K(S, ) can be understood as the degree that system
S is insecure with respect to policy . The smaller the value of K(S, ) is, the securer the
system S is. In particular, if K(S, ) = 0, then we say that S is secure with respect to .
Example 4.1 We extend Example 3.1 by adding a new agent Charles, so the agent set is
A = {Alice,Bob,Charles}. Consider the security policy  defined by Alice  Bob 
Charles. The system is expanded to include the third qubit, and the state space is then
H⊗32 . The initial state is |000〉. Alice, Bob and Charles can perform the measurement in the
computational basis on the first, second and third qubit, respectively.
1. Let the command set is C = {Rx(θ)}. The executions of Rx(θ) by Alice and Bob are
the same as in Example 3.1, and Charles executes Rx(θ) on the third qubit. It follows
immediately from Example 3.1 1) that K(S, ) = 0; that is, S is secure with respect
to .
2. Let the command set C = {Rx(θ), CNOT}. When Alice executes CNOT , the
controlled-NOT transformation is performed with the first qubit as the control qubit
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and the second as the target, and when Bob executes CNOT , the controlled-NOT
is performed with the second qubit as the control qubit and the third as the target.
Charles is not allowed to execute CNOT , or equivalently, when Charles executes
CNOT , nothing happens. Then it follows from Example 3.1 2) that
K(S, 1) ≥ Int(Bob,Charles)|Alice)
≥ Int(Bob|Alice) ≥ Int(Bob,CNOT |Alice) > 0,
and the system S is not secure with respect to policy  when θ 6= 0, π. 
Unwinding is a powerful proof technique for noninterference security of classical sys-
tems. We can extend the unwinding technique to quantum systems so that it can be used
to estimate a upper bound of K(S, ). A density operator in H is said to be reachable in
system S if there exists action sequence α ∈ (A×C)∗ such that ρ = Eα(ρ0). Then the first
version of unwinding theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.1 (Unwinding I) If for each agent a ∈ A, there exists an equivalence relation
a∼ on reachable density operators satisfying the following conditions:
• Step consistency: ρ a∼ σ ⇒ Eb,c(ρ) a∼ Eb,c(σ) for all b ∈ A and c ∈ C;
• Local respect of : b 6 a⇒ ρ a∼ Eb,c(ρ) for all c ∈ C ,
then we have:
K(S, ) ≤ sup{da(ρ, σ)|ρ and σ are
reachable, ρ
a∼ σ, and a ∈ A}. (7)

Eq. (7) gives a upper bound of the insecurity degree K(S, ) under the conditions of
Step consistency and Local respect of  . The reader who is familiar with the classical
unwinding technique may wonder that Observation consistence seems missing. Indeed, it
is incorporated into the right-hand side of Eq. (7). In particular, if the equivalence relations
a∼, a ∈ A satisfy the above conditions of Step consistency, Local respect of and
• Observation consistency: ρ a∼ σ ⇒ da(ρ, σ) = 0; that is, pE(ρ) = pE(σ) for all
POVM measurements E in Ma,
then S is secure with respect to .
It is known that unwinding proof technique is complete for classical noninterference
security [19, 22]. The next theorem shows that the unwinding proof technique presented in
Theorem 4.1 is complete for absolute security of quantum systems.
Theorem 4.2 (Partial Completeness of Unwinding I) If S is secure with respect to , then
there exists a family a∼, a ∈ A of equivalence relations on reachable density operators
satisfying Step consistency, Observation consistency and Local respect of . 
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4.2 Bounded-Time Security
Note that the length of action sequence α in Eq. (4) can be arbitrary. Thus, in the definition
equation (6) of insecurity degree K(S, ), the time used by malicious agents to detect sen-
sitive information is unlimited. We now consider a bounded-time variant of Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.3 Let t be a nonnegative real number. Then the degree that system S is
t−bounded insecure with respect to policy  is
Kt(S, ) = sup{da(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0)
|α ∈ (A× C)∗, |α| ≤ t, a ∈ A}.
Intuitively, Kt(S, ) measure the (in)security degree of system S with respect to policy
 under the assumption that the running time of the system does not exceeds t. It is obvious
that Kt(S, ) ≤ Kt′(S, ) if t ≤ t′. If particular, if Kt(S, ) = 0, then we say that S is
secure with respect to within time t.
We have a unwinding proof technique for bounded-time security too.
Theorem 4.3 (Unwinding II) Let ǫs, ǫo, ǫl be nonnegative real numbers. If for each agent
a ∈ A, there exists a pseudo-distance δa between reachable density operators satisfying the
following conditions:
• Approximate step consistency:
δa(Eb,c(ρ), Eb,c(σ)) ≤ δa(ρ, σ) + ǫs
for all b ∈ A and c ∈ C , and for all ρ, σ;
• Approximate observation consistency:
da(ρ, σ) ≤ δa(ρ, σ) + ǫo
for all ρ, σ;
• Approximate local respect of : if b 6 a, then it holds that
δa(ρ, Eb,c(ρ)) ≤ ǫl
for all c ∈ C , and for all ρ, σ,
then we have:
Kt(S, ) ≤ ǫo + t ·max{ǫs, ǫl}. (8)

A upper bound of insecurity degree Kt(S, ) is given by Eq. (8). The next theo-
rem derives a lower bound of insecurity degree K(S, ) through bounded-time security
Kt(S, ).
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Theorem 4.4 (Weak Completeness of Unwinding II) There exists a family δa, a ∈ A of
pseudo-distance on reachable density operators satisfying the following conditions:
• Step consistency:
δa(Eb,c(ρ), Eb,c(σ)) ≤ δa(ρ, σ)
for all b ∈ A and c ∈ C , and for all ρ, σ;
• Observation consistency:
da(ρ, σ) ≤ δa(ρ, σ)
for all ρ, σ;
• Bounded local respect of :
lim
t→t′
Kt(S, ) = K(S, )
≥ 1
2
sup{δa(ρ, Eb,c(ρ)|b 6 a, c ∈ C
and ρ is reachable}.
(9)

The lower bound of insecurity degree K(S, ) in Eq. (9) can be seen as a weak com-
pleteness of the unwinding technique presented in Theorem 4.3. In particular, if S is se-
cure with respect to  ; that is, K(S, ) = 0, then there exists a family δa, a ∈ A of
pseudo-distances on reachable density operators satisfying the above Step and Observation
consistency and the following:
• Local respect of : b 6 a⇒ δa(ρ, Eb,c(ρ)) = 0 for all c ∈ A and for all ρ.
4.3 Strong Security
Different from classical systems, the state of a quantum system is often not completely
known and thus the system is in a mixed state defined by a statistical ensemble. Some
stronger security degrees will be useful when we consider mixtures of initial states. Let ρ
be a density operator, {pi} a probability distribution, and ρi a density operator for every i.
If ρ =
∑
i piρi, then ρ is called a mixture of ensemble {(pi, ρi)} of density operators.
Before presenting the definition of strong security degree, we have to introduce a nota-
tion. Let S = 〈H, ρ0, A,C, do,messure〉, and let ρ′0 be a density operator. We write S[ρ′0]
for the new system obtained by replacing the initial state ρ0 in S by another initial state ρ′0;
that is,
S[ρ′0] = 〈H, ρ′0, A,C, do,messure〉.
Definition 4.4 1. The strong security degree of system S with respect to is
SK(S, ) = sup{
∑
i
piK(S[ρi], ) :
ρ0 is a mixture of ensemble {(pi, ρi)}}.
(10)
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2. Let t be a positive real number. Then the strong t−bounded security degree SKt(S, 
) of S with respect to is defined by Eq. (10) with K substituted by Kt.
5 Compositionality of Security
The purpose of this section is to examine security of a system composed of a collection of
subsystems. We consider two quantum systems
S = 〈H, ρ0, A,C, do,measure〉,
S
′ = 〈H′, ρ′0, A′, C ′, do′,measure′〉.
We can assume that C ∩ C ′ = ∅ without any loss of generality because the commands
in C are executed on the component S, whereas the commands in C ′ are executed on the
different component S′. However, it is allowed that A∩A′ = ∅ because the same agent may
be granted to access both components S and S′.
Definition 5.1 The composition of S and S′ is defined to be the quantum system
S⊗ S′ = 〈H ⊗H′, ρ0 ⊗ ρ′0, A ∪A′, C ∪ C ′,Do,Measure〉,
where
1. Do = {Fa,c|a ∈ A ∪A′ and c ∈ C ∪ C ′},
Fa,c =


Ea,c ⊗ IH′ if a ∈ A and c ∈ C,
IH ⊗ E ′a,c if a ∈ A′ and c ∈ C ′,
IH⊗H′ if a ∈ A \A′ and c ∈ C ′,
or a ∈ A′ \ A and c ∈ C;
(11)
2. Measure = {Na|a ∈ A ∪A′},
Na =


Ma if a ∈ A \ A′,
Ma ∪M′a if a ∈ A ∩A′,
Ma if a ∈ A′ \A.
(12)
To simplify presentation, a little bit of notation abuse was allowed in the defining equa-
tion of Na; for example, if E ∈ Ma and a ∈ A, then E is a measurement on the whole
system when it is considered in S, but it is a measurement on a subsystem S when it is
considered in S⊗ S′.
We also consider the combination of two security policies. To this end, we need a
notation. Let R ⊆ X ×X be a binary relation on X, and let Y ⊆ X. Then we write R|Y
for the restriction of R on Y ; that is, R|Y = {(x, y) ∈ Y × Y : xRy}.
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Definition 5.2 Let be a policy for agents A and ′ a policy for agents A′.
1. If |A ∩A′ = ′ |A ∩A′, then we say that and ′ are compatible.
2. The union of and ′ is the policy  ∪ ′ on agents A ∪A′.
Now we are ready to prove that security of quantum systems is compositional.
Theorem 5.1 If and ′ are compatible, then we have:
1. K(S⊗ S′, ∪ ′) ≤ K(S, ) +K(S′, ′);
2. Kt(S⊗ S′, ∪ ′) ≤ Kt(S, ) +Kt(S′, ′). 
The above theorem shows that the insecurity degree of a composed system does not
exceed the sum of the insecurity degrees of its component systems. In particular, if S and
S
′ are secure with respect to  and  ′, respectively (within time t), then S ⊗ S′ is secure
with respect to ∪ ′ (within time t).
The composition of quantum systems in Definition 5.1 is indeed a direct product in
which the component systems are entirely independent to each other except that some agent
can access to different components. We can introduce a more general notion of composition
where component quantum systems can be hooked up more tightly. To define it, we need
several auxiliary notions. Recall from [16] that the partial trace trH′ over H′ is a mapping
from density operators in H⊗H′ to density operators in H. It is defined by
trH′(|ϕ1〉〈ϕ2| ⊗ |ψ1〉〈ψ2|) = 〈ψ2|ψ1〉|ϕ1〉〈ϕ2|
for all |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 ∈ H1 and |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 ∈ H′, and it is extended to all density operators in
H ⊗H′ by linearity. Let ρ be a density operator in H and σ a density operator in H ⊗H′.
If trH′(σ) = ρ, then σ is called an extension of ρ in H ⊗H′. Let E be a super-operator on
H and F a super-operator on H ⊗H′. We say that F is a cylindrical extension of E on in
H⊗H′ if
1. trH′F(ρ⊗ 1d′ IH′) = E(ρ) for all density operators in H;
2. trHF(1dIH ⊗ ρ′) = ρ′ for all density operators ρ′ in H′,
where d = dimH and d′ = dimH′.
Definition 5.3 A generalised composition of S and S′ is defined to be a quantum system
T = 〈H ⊗H′, σ0, A ∪A′, C ∪ C ′,Do,Measure〉,
where
1. σ0 is both an extension of ρ0 and an extension of ρ′0 in H⊗H′;
2. Do = {Fa,c|a ∈ A ∪A′ and c ∈ C ∪ C ′} satisfies the following conditions:
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• Fa,c = IH⊗H′ if a ∈ A \A′ and c ∈ C ′, or a ∈ A′ \A and c ∈ C;
• Fa,c is a cylindrical extension of Ea,c if a ∈ A and c ∈ C;
• Fa,c is a cylindrical extension of E ′a,c if a ∈ A′ and c ∈ C ′;
3. Measure is the same as in Definition 5.1.
Theorem 5.1 can be extended to a special class of generalised compositions of quantum
systems. Recall from [11] that a density operator σ in H⊗H′ is said to be separable if we
can write:
σ =
∑
i
piρi ⊗ ρ′i
where all ρi are density operators in H and all ρ′i in H′, pi ≥ 0 for all i, and
∑
i pi = 1. A
super-operator F on H ⊗H′ is said to be separable if there are a family {Fi} of operators
on H and a family {F ′i} of operators on H′ such that
F(σ) =
∑
i
(Fi ⊗ F ′i )σ(F †i ⊗ F ′†i )
for all density operators σ on H ⊗ H′. If operators Fi commute, i.e. FiFj = FjFi for all
i 6= j, and operators F ′i commute, then F is said to be commutative.
Theorem 5.2 If  and  ′ are compatible, and T is a generalised composition of S and
S
′ with a separable initial state σ0 and commutative and separable super-operators Fa,c
(a ∈ A ∪A′, c ∈ C ∪ C ′), then we have:
1. K(T, ∪ ′) ≤ SK(S, ) + SK(S′, ′);
2. Kt(T, ∪ ′) ≤ SKt(S, ) + SKt(S′, ′). 
6 Access Control
As an application of the quantum noninterference formalism developed in the previous sec-
tions, we now analyse security of access control to quantum information. To do so, we
impose certain internal structure on the system under consideration by assuming that infor-
mation is stored in different locations.
Definition 6.1 We say that the system S has structured states if there exists a set N of
location names, and for each location name n ∈ N , there exists a Hilbert space Hn such
that
H =
⊗
n∈N
Hn.
In other words, the quantum system S is a composed system that consists of component
systems labeled by locations n ∈ N .
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There is an essential difference between quantum and classical systems that makes un-
derstanding access control in a quantum system harder than that in a classical system. In a
classical system, access control is usually defined by a matrix consisting of two functions
“read” and “alter”, specifying whether a given agent may “read”, “alter”, respectively the
information stored in given locations; for example, for each a ∈ A, read(a) is defined to
be a subset of location names N , and it is the set of locations whose values can be read by
agent a. The reasonableness of defining read(a) as a subset of N comes from an implicit
assumption:
• “1 + 1 = 1”: The ability to observe both the K subsystem (i.e. the subsystem
consisting components labeled by n ∈ K) and the L subsystem implies the ability to
observe the combined K ∪ L subsystem, where K,L ⊆ N .
Whenever this assumption is not valid, then read(a) must be defined as a subset of P(N)
instead of a subset of N , where we use P(·) to denote power set; for example, suppose
that N = {n1, n2, n3}. If agent a is allowed to read both the values of location n1 and
n2 but not the value of combined location n1n2, then read(a) = {{n1}, {n2}}; if agent
a is allowed to read the values of location n1 and n2 as well as n1n2, then read(a) =
{{n1}, {n2}, {n1, n2}}. Indeed, the above “1 + 1 = 1” assumption is violated in the
quantum world, as indicated by the next example. For simplicity, for any K ⊆ N , we write
trK for the partial trace tr⊗
n∈K Hn over the K subsystem.
Example 6.1 There are ρ, σ ∈ H =⊗n∈N Hn such that
1. trN\K(ρ) = trN\K(σ) and trN\L(ρ) = trN\L(σ); but
2. trN\(K∪L)(ρ) 6= trN\(K∪L)(σ).
In this case, an agent who can read information stored in K and information stored in L
but not information stored in K ∪ L is unable to distinguish ρ from σ. For instance, let
N = {n1, n2}, and let Hn1 = Hn2 be the 2−dimensional Hilbert space H2. We put
ρ =
1
2
|00〉〈00| + 1
2
|11〉〈11|,
and σ = |β00〉〈β00|, where |β00〉 = 1√2(|00〉 + |11〉) is the EPR pair. Then
trn1(ρ) = trn1(σ) =
1
2
(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|,
trn2(ρ) = trn2(σ) =
1
2
(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|,
but it is obvious that ρ 6= σ. 
Similarly, in the quantum world we know:
• The ability to change both the state of the K subsystem and the state of the L subsys-
tem does not guarantee the ability to change the combined K ∪ L subsystem.
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Example 6.2 There are ρ ∈ HN\K and σ ∈ HN\L such that
1. trN\(K∩L)(ρ) = trN\(K∩L)(σ); but
2. there does not exist ant γ ∈ HN\(K∪L) such that trN\K(γ) = ρ and trN\L(γ) = σ.

Another essential difference between quantum and classical information is that reading the
quantum information stored in a certain location changes the information itself; but this dif-
ference will not be considered in this paper because in the noninterference formalism read-
ing (by quantum measurements) always happens at the end, and thus the post-measurement
state of the system is irrelevant.
By the above observation, we realise that both read(a) and alter(a) should be defined
as elements of P(P(N)). They can be simplified a little bit by noticing that if an agent can
read (resp. alter) the value of locations K then it can read (resp. alter) the value of any
subset L of K . A family B ∈ P(P(N)) of sets of location names is said to be below-closed
if
K ∈ B and L ⊆ K ⇒ L ∈ B.
We write PB(P(N)) for the set of all below-closed B ∈ P(P(N)).
Definition 6.2 An access control matrix consists of:
1. a function read : A→ PB(P(N)); and
2. a function alter : A→ PB(P(N)),
For each agent a ∈ A, if K ∈ read(a), then the K subsystem can be observed by a;
and if K ∈ alter(a), then the state of the K subsystem can be changed by a.
We now consider security of quantum access control with respect to a policy.
Definition 6.3 An access control matrix (read, alter) satisfies security policy  if
1. a b⇒ read(a) ⊆ read(b);
2. (∃K ∈ read(a),∃L ∈ alter(b) s.t. K ∩ L 6= ∅)⇒ b a.
To present the quantum generalisation of Rushby’s security theorem for access con-
trol [19], we need to introduce a new pseudo-distance between density operators. For each
agent a ∈ A, we define distance δa by
δa(ρ, σ) = sup
K∈read(a)
d(trN\K(ρ), trN\K(σ))
for all reachable density operators ρ, σ in H = ⊗n∈N Hn. Intuitively, δa(ρ, σ) measures
the difference between ρ and σ at the locations that agent a can observe. Note that in the
defining equation of δa, the supremum is taken over the distances d in some subspaces of H
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of different dimensions. From Eqs. (2) and (3) we see that the distances d does not depends
on the dimensions of these subspaces, so this defining equation is not problematic.
Let ǫ > 0 and K ⊆ N . For any density operators ρ, σ ∈ H, if
d(trN\K(ρ), trN\K(σ)) > ǫ,
then we say that ρ and σ are ǫ−discriminable on K , and write Dis(ρ, σ|ǫ,K). Now we are
ready to present the main result of this section, which gives a upper bound of bounded-time
insecurity degree in terms of Reference Monitor Assumption and thus generalises Theorem
2 of [19] to the quantum case.
Theorem 6.1 If the access control matrix satisfies policy  and the Reference Monitor
Assumptions: for all a ∈ A, for all c ∈ C , for all ρ, σ, and for all K ⊆ N ,
(RM1) da(ρ, σ) ≤ δa(ρ, σ) + θ;
(RM2)
Dis(ρ, Ea,c(ρ)|ǫ,K) ∨Dis(σ, Ea,c(σ)|ǫ,K)
⇒ ¬Dis(Ea,c(ρ), Ea,c(σ)|δa(ρ, σ),K);
(RM3)
Dis(ρ, Ea,c(ρ)|ǫ,K)⇒ ∃L ∈ alter(a) s.t. K ∩ L 6= ∅,
then it holds that Kt(S, ) ≤ θ + 2tǫ. 
7 Conclusion
The noninterference formalism of information-flow security is generalised to the quantum
case. We define three (in)security degrees K(S, ), Kt(S, ) and SK(S, ) of a quantum
system modelled by a quantum automaton S with respect to a security policy  . The
unwinding technique for proving noninterference security is extended so that it can be used
to give a upper bound of the (in)security degrees of quantum systems. A compositionality
theorem for security of quantum systems is established, showing that the (in)security degree
of a composite system does not exceed the sum of the (in)security degrees of its components.
For further research, one open question is to settle the computational complexity of the
following problem: given a quantum system S, a security policy , and a rational constant
c, decide whether K(S, ) < c, Kt(S, ) < c, and SK(S, ) < c?
Only transitive noninterference for quantum systems is considered in this paper. As
argued in [10], [19], transitive policies are too restrictive for many realistic applications, and
since then intransitive noninterference for classical systems has been intensively studied; see
for example [18], [22], [23]. So, another topic for further research is to define intransitive
noninterference for quantum systems.
Noninterference was also defined by Focardi and Gorrieri [5] and Ryan and Schnei-
der [17] in the framework of process algebras based on the notion of process equivalence.
Several quantum processes have been defined in the last decade, including Jorrand and
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Lalire’s QPAlg [12], Gay and Nagarajan’s CQP [6] and the authors’ qCCS [3], [4]. In
particular, a bisimilarity preserved by parallel composition of quantum processes with en-
tanglement was recently discovered by the authors [3, 4] and Davidson [1]. A process
equivalence-based quantum interference would be another interesting topic.
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Appendix: Proofs of Main Results
A. Proofs of Theorems in Section 4
A.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1
By definition, we have:
K(S, ) = sup{da(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0))
|α ∈ (A×C)∗ and a ∈ A}.
So, it suffices to show that for each a ∈ A and for each α ∈ (A× C)∗,
Eα(ρ0) a∼ Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0).
This can be easily done by induction on the length of α, and we omit the routine details. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2
For each agent a ∈ A, we define:
ρ
a∼ σ ⇔ da(Eα(ρ), Eα(σ)) = 0 for all α ∈ (A× C)∗.
It is easy to see that a∼, a ∈ A satisfy Step and Observation consistency. To show that
they locally respect  , we assume that b 6 a. Then for any reachable density operator
ρ, we have ρ = Eβ(ρ0) for some action sequence β ∈ (A × C)∗. Furthermore, for any
α ∈ (A×C)∗ and for any c ∈ C , it holds that
purge
▽a(βα) = purge▽a(β(b, c)α).
Therefore, we have
da(Eα(ρ), Eα(Eb,c(ρ))) = da(Eβα(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))
≤ da(Eβα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0))+
da(Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))
= da(Eβα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0))+
da(Epurge
▽a(β(b,c)α)
(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))
≤ 2 ·K(S, ) = 0.
Consequently, it holds that ρ a∼ Eb,c(ρ). 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 4.3
By definition, we only need to prove that for every agent a ∈ A and for all action sequence
α ∈ (A×C)∗ with |α| ≤ t,
da(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0)) ≤ ǫo + t ·max{ǫs, ǫl}.
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It follows from the approximate observation consistency that
da(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0))
≤ δa(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0)) + ǫo.
Thus, it suffices to show that
δa(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0)) ≤ t ·max{ǫs, ǫl}.
We proceed by induction on the length |α| of α. The basis case of |α| = 0 is clear. Now we
assume that α = α′(b, c) and consider the following two cases:
Case 1. b a. Then
purge
▽a(α) = purge▽a(α
′)(b, c),
and by the induction hypothesis on α′ we have:
δa(Eα′(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α
′)(ρ0)) ≤ (t− 1) ·max{ǫs, ǫl}
because |α′| = |α| − 1 ≤ t− 1. Thus, by the approximate step consistency we obtain:
δa(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0))
= δa(Eb,c(Eα(ρ0)), Eb,c(Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0)))
≤ δa(Eα′(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α
′)(ρ0)) + ǫs
≤ (t− 1) ·max{ǫs, ǫl}+ ǫs
≤ t ·max{ǫs, ǫl}.
Case 2. b 6 a. Then
purge
▽a(α) = purge▽a(α
′),
and the approximate local respect of and the induction hypothesis on α′ yield
δa(Eα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(α)
(ρ0))
= δa(Eb,c(Eα′(ρ0)), Epurge
▽a(α
′)(ρ0))
≤ δa(Eb,c(Eα′(ρ0)), Eα′(ρ0)))
+ δa(Eα(ρ0)), Epurge
▽a(α
′)(ρ0))
≤ ǫl + (t− 1) ·max{ǫs, ǫl}
≤ t ·max{ǫs, ǫl}.

30
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4.4
For each a ∈ A, and for any reachable density operators ρ, σ, we define:
δa(ρ, σ) = sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Eα(ρ), Eα(σ)).
It is easy to see that δa is a pseudo-distance for each a ∈ A. Step and Observation consis-
tency follow immediately from the definition of δa. We now prove the bounded local respect
of  . It suffices to show that for any a, b ∈ A, c ∈ C , and reachable density operator ρ, if
b 6 a, then
δa(ρ, Eb,c(ρ)) ≤ 2K(S, ).
In fact, since ρ is reachable, it holds that ρ = Eβ(ρ0) for some β ∈ (A × C)∗. Thus, we
have:
δa(ρ, Eb,c(ρ)) = sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Eα(ρ), Eα(Eb,c(ρ)))
= sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Eβα(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))
≤ sup
α∈(A×C)∗
[da(Eβα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0))
+ da(Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))]
≤ sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Eβα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0))
+ sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))
= sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Eβα(ρ0), Epurge
▽a(βα)
(ρ0))
+ sup
α∈(A×C)∗
da(Epurge
▽a(β(b,c)α)
(ρ0), Eβ(b,c)α(ρ0))
≤ 2K(S, )
because b 6 a implies purge
▽a(β(b, c)α) = purge▽a(βα). 
B. Proof of Theorems in Section 5
We first present two technical lemmas needed in the proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2.
Lemma B.1: If all POVM measurements in M are all performed on the first subsystem,
then we have:
dM(ρ1 ⊗ ρ, ρ2 ⊗ ρ′) = dM(ρ1, ρ2)
for any density operators ρ1, ρ2 of the first subsystem, and for any density operators ρ, ρ′ of
the second subsystem.
Proof: For each POVM measurement E in M, since it is performed only on the first
subsystem, we can write E = {Eλ ⊗ I}λ, where Eλ is an operator on the first subsystem
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for every λ, and I is the identity operator on the second subsystem. Thus,
pE(ρ1 ⊗ ρ, λ) = tr((Eλ ⊗ I)(ρ1 ⊗ ρ))
= tr((Eλρ1)⊗ ρ) = tr(Eλρ1) · tr(ρ)
= tr(Eλρ1) = pE(ρ1, λ);
that is, the probability distribution defineed by E and ρ1 ⊗ ρ is equal to that defined by E
and ρ1. Similarly, we have pE(ρ2 ⊗ ρ′) = pE(ρ2). Therefore,
d(pE(ρ1 ⊗ ρ), pE(ρ2 ⊗ ρ′)) = d(pE(ρ1), pE(ρ2)),
and the conclusion follows. 
Lemma B.2: (Convexity of Measurement Distance) Let M be a family of POVM mea-
surements, let {pi} be a probability distribution, and let ρi and σi be density operators for
every i. Then
dM(
∑
i
piρi,
∑
i
piσi) ≤
∑
i
pidM(ρi, σi).
Proof: We first prove the conclusion in the special case where M is a singleton {E}. In
thos case, we simply write dE for dM. Suppose that E = {Eλ}λ∈Λ. By definition, we have:
dE(
∑
i
piρi,
∑
i
piσi)
=
∑
λ∈Λ
|tr(Eλ(
∑
i
piρi))− tr(Eλ(
∑
i
piσi))|
=
∑
λ∈Λ
|
∑
i
pitr(Eλρi)−
∑
i
pitr(Eλσi)|
≤
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
i
pi|tr(Eλρi)− tr(Eλσi)|
=
∑
i
pi
∑
λ∈Λ
|tr(Eλρi)− tr(Eλσi)|
=
∑
i
pidE(ρi, σi).
(13)
In general, it follows from Eq. (13) that
dM(
∑
i
piρi,
∑
i
piσi) = sup
E∈M
dE(
∑
i
piρi,
∑
i
piσi)
≤ sup
E∈M
∑
i
pidE(ρi, σi)
≤
∑
i
pi sup
E∈M
dE(ρi, σi)
=
∑
i
pidM(ρi, σi).
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Now we are ready to prove Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. Theorem 5.1 can be proved in a way
that is similar to but easier than the proof of Theorem 5.2.
For Theorem 5.2, we only prove 1) because 2) can be proved in the same way. For each
a ∈ A ∪A′, we put
▽a = {b ∈ A ∪A′ : not b( ∪ ′)a}.
Then it suffices to show that for all α ∈ [(A ∪A′)× (C ∪ C ′)]∗,
Da(Fα(σ0), Fpurge
▽a(α)
(σ0)
≤ SK(S, ) + SK(S′, ′), (14)
where Da is the measurement distance in the composed system T; that is, Da = dNa . Let
β, γ, δ be the subsequences of α consisting of elements in A×C,A′ ×C ′ and [(A \A′)×
C ′] ∪ [(A′ \ A) × C], respectively, and let β′, γ′, δ′ be the corresponding subsequences of
purge
▽a(α). Since the initial state σ0 is separable, we can write σ0 in the following way:
σ0 =
∑
i
pi(ρi ⊗ ρ′i),
where {pi} is a probability distribution, and ρi, ρ′i are density operators in H and H′, re-
spectively, for every i.
(i) By definition, we obtain:
ρ0 = trH′(σ0) =
∑
i
piρi.
So, ρ0 is a mixture of ensemble {(pi, ρi)}. Similarly, we see that ρ′0 is a mixture of ensemble
{(pi, ρ′i)}.
(ii) It follows from Eq. (11) that
Fα(σ0) =
∑
i
piFα(ρi ⊗ ρ′i)
=
∑
i
pi[Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i)]
because any operator of the form E ⊗IH′ commutes with any operator of the form IH⊗E ′.
Similarly, we have:
Fpurge
▽a(α)
(σ0) =
∑
i
pi[Eβ′(ρi)⊗ E ′γ′(ρ′i)].
Now we consider the following three cases:
Case 1. a ∈ A \A′. We write:
▽1a = {b ∈ A : b 6 a}.
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Then by the compatibility of and ′ we have:
▽a = ▽1a ∪ (A′ \ A),
β′ = purge
▽1a
(β),
γ′ = ǫ (empty string).
Furthermore, using Eq. (12) and Lemmas B.1 and B.2 we obtain:
Da(Fα(σ0),Fpurge
▽a(α)
(σ0))
= dMa(
∑
i
pi[Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i)],
∑
i
pi[Eβ′(ρi)⊗ E ′γ′(ρ′i)])
= dMa(
∑
i
pi[Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i)],
∑
i
pi[Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi)⊗ ρ′i)])
≤
∑
i
pidMa(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ ρ
′
i))
≤
∑
i
pidMa(Eβ(ρi), Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi))
≤
∑
i
piK(S[ρi], )
≤ SK(S, ).
Case 2. a ∈ A′ \ A. Similar to Case 1.
Case 3. a ∈ A ∩A′. We write:
▽2a = {b ∈ A′ : b 6 ′ a}.
Then by the compatibility of and ′ we have:
▽a = ▽1a ∪ ▽2a,
β′ = purge
▽1a
(β),
γ′ = purge
▽2a
(γ).
It follows from Eq. (12) and Lemma B.1 that
Da(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ E
′
γ(ρ
′
i))
= dMa∪M′a(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ E
′
γ(ρ
′
i))
= max{dMa(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ E
′
γ(ρ
′
i)),
dM′a(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ E
′
γ(ρ
′
i))}
= dMa(Eβ(ρi), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi))
≤ K(S[ρi], ).
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Similarly, we have:
Da(Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)
⊗ E ′
purge
▽2a
(γ)(ρ
′
i)) ≤ K(S′[ρ′i], ′).
Therefore, it holds that
Da(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ E
′
purge
▽2a
(γ)(ρ
′
i))
≤ Da(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i), Epurge▽1a(β)(ρi)⊗ E
′
γ(ρ
′
i))
+Da(Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i),
Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi)⊗ E ′purge
▽2a
(γ)(ρ
′
i))
≤ K(S[ρi], ) +K(S′[ρ′i], ′).
Finally, by Lemma B.2 we obtain:
Da(Fα(σ0),Fpurge
▽a(α)
(σ0))
= Da(
∑
i
pi[Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i)],
∑
i
pi[Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi)⊗ E ′purge
▽1a
(γ)(ρ
′
i))])
≤
∑
i
piDa(Eβ(ρi)⊗ E ′γ(ρ′i),
Epurge
▽1a
(β)(ρi)⊗ E ′purge
▽1a
(γ)(ρ
′
i)))
≤
∑
i
pi[K(S[ρi], ) +K(S
′[ρ′i], 
′)]
=
∑
i
piK(S[ρi], ) +
∑
i
piK(S
′[ρ′i], 
′)
≤ SK(S, ) + SK(S′, ′)]

C. Proof of Theorem 6.1
We first prove the following two claims:
Claim1. δa(Eb,c(ρ), Eb,c(σ)) ≤ δa(ρ, σ) + 2ǫ.
To prove this claim, we only need to show that for any K ∈ read(a),
d(trK(Eb,c(ρ)), trK(Eb,c(σ))) ≤ δa(ρ, σ) + 2ǫ.
We consider the following cases:
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Case 1. ρ and Eb,c(ρ) are ǫ−discriminable on K . Then it follows from (RM2) that
Eb,c(ρ) and Eb,c(σ) are not δb(ρ, σ)−discriminable; that is,
d(trK(Eb,c(ρ)), trK(Eb,c(σ))) ≤ δb(ρ, σ). (15)
On the other hand, by (RM3) we have K ∩L 6= ∅ for some L ∈ alter(b), and by condition
2) of Definition 6.3 and K ∈ read(a) we further obtain b a. This together with condition
1) of Definition 6.3 implies that read(b) ⊆ read(a), and by definition we have δb(ρ, σ) ≤
δa(ρ, σ). Therefore, it follows from Eq. (15) that
d(trK(Eb,c(ρ)), trK(Eb,c(σ))) ≤ δa(ρ, σ).
Case 2. σ and Eb,c(σ) are ǫ−discriminable on K . Similar to Case 1.
Case 3. ρ and Eb,c(ρ) are not ǫ−discriminable onK , and σ and Eb,c(σ) are not ǫ−discriminable
on K . Then it holds that
d(trK(Eb,c(ρ)), trK(Eb,c(σ))) ≤ d(trK(Eb,c(ρ)), trK(ρ))
+ d(trK(ρ), trK(σ)) + d(trK(σ), trK(Eb,c(σ)))
≤ δa(ρ, σ) + 2ǫ.
Claim2. b 6 a⇒ δa(ρ, Eb,c(ρ)) ≤ ǫ.
To prove this claim, we only need to show that for any K ∈ read(a),
d(trK(ρ), trK(Eb,c(ρ)) ≤ ǫ.
This can be done by refutation. If there exists K ∈ read(a) such that
d(trK(ρ), trK(Eb,c(ρ)) > ǫ;
that is, ρ and Eb,c(ρ) are ǫ−discriminable on K , then by (RM3) we assert that there exists
L ∈ alter(a) with K ∩ L 6= ∅. It follows from condition 2) of Definition 6.3 that b  a.
This contradicts to the assumption that b 6 a.
Finally, by combining (RM1) and Claims 1 and 2 and applying Theorem 4.3 we obtain:
Kt(S, ) ≤ θ + t ·max{2ǫ, ǫ} = θ + 2tǫ.

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